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1 
Introduction 
 
 This thesis will compare the United States’ refugee policy in the Indochinese 
refugee crisis with its policy in the ongoing refugee crises in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. 
From 1975 to 1997 the United States admitted 1,287,399 refugees for resettlement from 
just three countries: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.1 These refugees fled in multiple 
waves from the violence arising from the end of the wars in those three countries, and 
from years of state repression, “re-education,” discrimination and genocide that occurred 
after the communist victories in 1975.2 The resettlement of the many refugees from this 
long-unfolding humanitarian crisis spanned five administrations from Ford to Clinton, 
but most of the resettlement was done by the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations.3 
Over this period the United States was also an active participant in the formulation of and 
execution of multilateral solutions to the refugee crisis, including the Orderly Departure 
Program set up by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which 
saw would-be refugees leaving for resettlement directly from Vietnam instead of fleeing 
dangerously.4 
 In contrast, the U.S. has resettled far fewer refugees from the countries where it 
has become involved in the War on Terror. The country has admitted 14,947 refugees 
from Afghanistan since 2002, 143,383 from Iraq since 2003, and 20,966 from Syria since 
                                                          
1 W. Courtland Robinson, Terms of Refuge: the Indochinese Exodus & the International Response, London: 
Zed Books, 2000, 295. 
2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of 
Humanitarian Action, Geneva, 1 January 2000, Accessed 1 February 2018, 82-101. 
3 Linda Gordon, "Southeast Asian Refugee Migration” Center for Migration Studies Special Issues 5, no. 3 
(May 1987): 156. 
4 Judith Kumin, "Orderly Departure from Vietnam: Cold War Anomaly or Humanitarian 
Innovation?" Refugee Survey Quarterly 27, no. 1 (January 01, 2008): 104-105. Accessed March 11, 2018. 
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2011, for a total of 179,326 from all three countries.5 If this number is expanded to 
include Special Immigrant Visa admissions, which is a visa category set up for Afghan 
and Iraqi nationals who worked with U.S. military personnel and contractors, the number 
rises to 246,729.6 Although the time periods are not yet the exact same length (16 ⅓ years 
for Afghanistan, 15 ⅓ years for Iraq and 6 ⅓ for Syria vs. 22 years for the post-Vietnam 
response period covered), the admissions numbers are still markedly lower for the War 
on Terror countries than they were in the Indochina refugee crisis. 
 Why compare these two situations at all? Much has been made by the media of 
the United States’ open-ended and still-ongoing military engagements in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and their supposed parallels to the Vietnam War. A simple Google search for 
“Vietnam War Afghanistan Iraq” yields hundreds of hits discussing the similarities and 
differences. While it is certainly true that no two historical events are exactly the same, 
several factors serve to illustrate that the Vietnam War and the War on Terror 
engagements do share several important parallels. The most commonly cited one is 
length, as the Afghanistan War has passed Vietnam to become America’s longest foreign 
war.7 Both conflicts were fought against insurgencies, though it is true that the Vietnam 
War also featured a regular army opponent that was not present in Afghanistan or Iraq 
                                                          
5 United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing 
Center, Refugee Admissions Report January 31, 2018, January 31, 2018, Accessed February 26, 2018. 
6 United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing 
Center, Cumulative Arrivals by State for Refugee and SIV - Afghan FY07 -FY17 as of February 26, 2018, 
February 26, 2018, Accessed February 26, 2018; United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, 
Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing Center, Cumulative Arrivals by State for Refugee and SIV - 
Iraqi FY07 -FY17 as of February 26, 2018, February 26, 2018, Accessed February 26, 2018; I have chosen 
to consider Special Immigrant Visa recipients alongside refugees for Iraq and Afghanistan, because, though 
they did not exist in the Indochinese crisis, they represent a class of persons who made up a significant 
portion of the Indochinese evacuees: those linked to the U.S. military and government. I believe including 
them makes the quantitative comparison more valid. 
7 Adam Taylor, "These are America’s 9 longest foreign wars," The Washington Post, May 29, 2014, 
Accessed March 13, 2018. 
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(outside of the very initial stage of the 2003 Iraq invasion). More importantly, U.S. 
military involvement was justified in each instance as a necessary step to curb the spread 
of a dangerous ideology – communism in the case of Vietnam and Islamic terrorism in 
the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, both Vietnam and the War on Terror 
deployments have been viewed by the American public as a mistake, according to polling 
data.8 
 Why include Syria alongside Iraq and Afghanistan in this comparison of policies? 
Though it is true that the violence in Syria, and thus the refugee flows it has created, are 
not completely the fault of the United States (though neither were the refugee flows post-
Vietnam, or from Iraq or Afghanistan), U.S. involvement in the war has been significant. 
The involvement of ISIS in the war is partly attributable to the United States’ invasion of 
Iraq, which helped created the al-Qaeda insurgency in that country that eventually 
morphed into ISIS.9 The U.S. has been involved in Syria since 2013, arming groups to 
fight against ISIS and the Syrian government of Assad and performing airstrikes against 
ISIS.10 The U.S. has also ramped up its efforts against the Syrian regime itself with 
airstrikes on Syrian bases and U.S. troops on the ground. Secretary of State Tillerson 
announced that this in an open-ended commitment to both combat terrorist groups and 
ensure the downfall of the Assad regime.11 This demonstrates that Syria has become 
something of a great power rivalry between the United States and Russia, who supports 
                                                          
8 Frank Newport, "More Americans Now View Afghanistan War as a Mistake," Gallup, February 19, 2014, 
Accessed March 13, 2018. 
9 Zachary Laub, "The Islamic State," Council on Foreign Relations, August 10, 2016, Accessed March 13, 
2018. 
10 David Sanger, Eric Schmitt, and Ben Hubbard, "Trump Ends Covert Aid to Syrian Rebels Trying to 
Topple Assad," The New York Times, July 19, 2017, Accessed March 13, 2018. 
11 Julian Borger, Patrick Wintour, and Kareem Shaheen, "US military to maintain open-ended presence in 
Syria, Tillerson says," The Guardian, January 17, 2018, Accessed March 13, 2018. 
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Assad. The Vietnam War was also a great power proxy conflict in addition to a fight 
against an ideology. This, combined with Syria’s connection to the Iraq invasion via ISIS, 
justifies its inclusion in this comparison. 
Taken together, the War on Terror conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria 
comprise a protracted U.S. military and political campaign to contain a hostile ideology, 
reduce the influence of rival powers, and build regimes favorable to its own interests. 
This campaign takes place in an already embattled region with a complex history and 
unique cultural tensions and dynamics, using both direct military assets and proxies. The 
United States’ involvement in Vietnam can fit within this description as well, so an 
analysis of the refugee crises attendant to the conflicts, and their respective responses, 
can provide a useful look into U.S. policy and the conditions that motivate it. 
 To facilitate this side-by-side analysis, data on U.S. refugee resettlement has been 
collected from UN retrospective reports and secondary sources (for the Indochinese 
countries) and U.S. government published statistics (for the War on Terror countries). In 
order to make these two situations more directly comparable, these raw statistics are 
presented alongside other metrics, such as percentage of refugees created by each conflict 
that were resettled by the U.S., and refugees resettled as a percentage of U.S. population. 
This forms the quantitative comparison of the two cases. Alongside this numerical 
approach, each policy will be contextualized and explained by examining primary 
sources, such as speeches, statements, departmental reports, and State Department 
communiques (where available), as well as secondary sources to understand the reasons 
for and behind each of the policies. U.S. opinion polls on refugee resettlement will also 
5 
be considered. These two methods will elucidate the ways in which U.S. policy has been 
similar and different in the two cases, and why that is so. 
 This research will be guided by three main questions. The first is, how exactly are 
the policies different? This will be mostly achieved by the quantitative consideration of 
the resettlement policies, with the appropriate manipulation of the variables to make the 
two responses more comparable between time periods. The second question is, why was 
each policy established in the way that it was, and what factors, particularly domestic and 
international political ones, were most responsible for the formulation? This will be 
answered with the consideration of primary and secondary works detailing the political 
and foreign policy climate and considerations surrounding each scenario. It is likely this 
comparison will shed more light on the differences between the Cold War and the War on 
Terror, particularly their relative strengths in motivating such a hybrid of foreign and 
domestic policy as refugee resettlement. The third question to be answered is, what 
lessons can the Indochinese refugee response teach us about the current crisis? What 
policies changes might the nation make in light of its historical ones? 
 The goal of this study is not only to determine how and why the United States 
responded differently to these two refugee crises, but also to determine how to apply 
lessons from the handling of the past crisis to the current one. To that end, this thesis will 
conclude with policy recommendations for a future administration that will serve to 
improve U.S. refugee policy, for these countries and generally, both to increase effective  
implementation of U.S. foreign policy goals and address ongoing humanitarian crises. 
 
6 
Chapter 1: Indochinese Refugee Policy12 
 
 Prior to the 1973 ceasefire brokered by the U.S., the Vietnam War created 
millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within South and North Vietnam, who 
moved to the relatively safer urban areas. Some of these may actually be considered 
refugees, since they moved from North to South Vietnam, or vice versa, but exactly how 
many crossed the international border during the war is unknown. During the war there 
was not significant movement outside of Vietnam by Vietnamese refugees, however. The 
U.S government recognized this increase of IDPs but, despite its deep involvement in the 
war, moved virtually none to safety in the United States. The only significant 
immigration of Vietnamese to the U.S. before 1975 was that of war brides, who 
numbered in the thousands.13 The U.S. also recognized that there would likely be political 
refugees created in both North and South Vietnam as a result of the 1973 ceasefire. 
However, a state department official told Congress in 1973 that he “did not anticipate 
them coming to the United States…it would be our opinion that they could be resettled in 
their own country.”14 U.S. admission of refugees from the Indochinese conflicts did not 
start until after the fall of Saigon. 
 The first wave of refugee acceptances by the United States took place in 1975, 
with 130,400 admitted, over 95 percent from Vietnam and most of the rest from 
                                                          
12 The U.S. Government only publishes U.S. refugee admissions data by region, not by country, for years 
before 2001. In order to isolate data for the specific region under consideration, the data in this section is 
compiled from a variety of sources, including scholarly articles from the period and retrospective UNHCR 
reports and books. Data tables from these sources can be found in Appendix A. 
13 David M Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992, 175. 
14 United States Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 1, Western Hemisphere 
Immigration, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 105. 
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Cambodia.15 These refugees were mostly “at-risk” individuals evacuated from Saigon 
immediately during and after the fall of the city. They included Catholics, Buddhists, 
government officials, landowners, and those who worked for the U.S. government, and 
their families. Interestingly, the U.S. government actually intended the number evacuated 
(and eventually resettled) from the south to be considerably higher, with President Ford’s 
Interagency Task Force for Indochina recommending 197,000 Vietnamese to be 
evacuated. Secretary of State Kissinger eventually ordered U.S. Ambassador to South 
Vietnam Graham Martin on April 17th to evacuate 200,000. However, Martin was 
stubborn and believed a last-minute deal with the North could be reached, so he did not 
begin the main evacuation until twelve days later, leading to a lower number of refugees 
evacuated and resettled than planned.16 
 An interesting subset of the 1975 evacuation was Operation Babylift. This U.S. 
government operation airlifted 2,547 Vietnamese and Cambodian orphans for adoption in 
the United States and other countries from April 3rd to April 26th.17 It was the brainchild 
of Ambassador Martin who persuaded the head of the Vietnamese government to accept 
the program, both so that Vietnam would gain sympathy in the U.S., and to show the rest 
of the world Americans’ humanitarian ways. This evacuation was very popular with the 
American public, as a poll found that 56 percent were in favor of the move with 32 
percent opposed.18 The U.S. public did not extend its favor to the broader resettlement of 
1975 evacuees, however. A poll conducted in May of that year showed 49 percent of 
                                                          
15 Gordon, "Southeast Asian Refugee Migration," 155. 
16 Nghia M. Vo, Vietnamese Boat People, 1954 and 1975-1992, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 
2005, 64-65. 
17 United States Agency for International Development. Operation Babylift Report (Emergency Movement 
of Vietnamese and Cambodian Orphans for Intercountry Adoption, April - June 1975). Washington, DC. 
Accessed March 13, 2018. 
18 Reimers, Still the Golden Door, 176-177. 
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Americans opposed to allowing the evacuees to stay, against 37 percent in favor and 14 
percent unsure.19 
 The crisis was not confined to the immediate aftermath from the fall of Saigon, 
however. In 1977, more refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos began to leave their 
countries. This trickle would turn into a flood in 1978 and 1979. Vietnam forced over a 
million people into “reeducation” camps and collectivized agriculture, which drove 
hundreds of thousands to flee in boats to neighboring countries. Additional refugees fled 
Cambodia’s genocidal Khmer Rouge regime and the Vietnamese invasion that dislodged 
it. Ethnic minorities like the Hmong (who had fought for the United States against the 
Communist Pathet Lao during the Vietnam War), along with landholders and farmers 
dispossessed by Communist reforms, departed Laos.20 
 The United States responded to the growth of the crisis by stepping up to resettle 
hundreds of thousands more refugees. From 1978 to 1985 the U.S. accepted and resettled 
613,400 Indochinese refugees, including 352,800 Vietnamese, 137,800 Laotians, and 
122,800 Cambodians.21 The U.S. government moved against popular opinion in these 
later waves of resettlement. Sixty-two percent of Americans were opposed to the Carter 
administration’s June 1979 announcement that it would resettle 14,000 Indochinese 
refugees per month, but admissions went on despite this disapproval.22 
 As the 1980s wore on, the composition of refugees changed. This third wave 
began to include unaccompanied minors sent by their families because of a lack of 
                                                          
19 Drew DeSilver, "U.S. Public Seldom Has Welcomed Refugees into Country," Pew Research Center, 
November 19, 2015, Accessed April 02, 2018. 
20 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, 82-101. 
21 Gordon, "Southeast Asian Refugee Migration,”155. 
22 DeSilver, “U.S. Public Seldom Welcomed Refugees.” 
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economic prospects, alongside the political dissidents and those connected to the former 
regime that made up the earlier waves.23 UNHCR established new programs that were 
more stringent in vetting refugees, and thus resettlements by the U.S. and other countries 
declined through the 1980s and 1990s.24  
Including the entire period of the crisis, from 1975 to 1997, the U.S. resettled 
1,287,399 refugees from the region.25 Approximately 3 million refugees fled in total from 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in the same period. Of these, 2.5 million were eventually 
resettled outside of the three countries concerned, while roughly half a million were 
repatriated or returned, either voluntarily or involuntarily.26 This means the United States 
resettled 43% of all the refugees that fled, and 51% of all the refugees that were 
ultimately resettled somewhere. For further context, thr population of the United States in 
1975 was 215,973,199.27 This means that the total number of resettled refugees, admitted 
over twenty years, would have constituted 0.59% of the U.S.’s population in 1975. These 
figures will be compared to their contemporary counterparts in the next chapter. 
The very definition of refugee that the United States operated under at the 
beginning of the Indochinese crisis was driven by foreign policy considerations. Congress 
passed the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965, which markedly departed from 
America’s previous immigration policy. The new act abolished the system of national 
origin quotas, instead setting up seven categories for immigrants that mostly focused on 
family reunification and those with skills that would benefit the U.S. economy. The 
                                                          
23 Vo, The Vietnamese Boat People, 97-98. 
24 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, 101. 
25 Robinson, Terms of Refuge, 295. 
26 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, 99. 
27 "Historical National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999," U.S. Census Bureau, June 28, 
2000, Accessed February 3, 2018. 
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seventh category was reserved for refugees, creating for the first time a permanent 
refugee provision in U.S. immigration law.28 The Act defined refugees in a very 
particular way, as those fleeing from “Communist or Communist-dominated” countries 
or areas, or the general area of the Middle East, and were unable to return to their homes 
because of race, religion, or political opinion.29 This definition was still in place in 1975 
at the start of the Indochinese crisis. The 1965 statute was clearly driven by the 
framework of Cold War politics and the constant need for America to outshine 
communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. This same framework was still 
in place in 1975 when the crisis began, and remained a factor in the U.S. government’s 
refugee policy for years. 
 The Ford administration certainly had its hands full in the spring of 1975. Besides 
a lagging economy and the continuing fallout from the Watergate Scandal, Ford inherited 
the problem of the Vietnam War from his predecessors. By 1975 it was becoming clear 
that the ceasefire with the North would not hold. The North Vietnamese Army began 
their offensive in January and had reached the outskirts of Saigon by April. As they 
closed in on the city, the administration set up an Interagency Task Force for Indochina 
Refugees on April 18th to evaluate the government’s options.30 Although the response 
was delayed by personnel on the ground, the direct evacuation by the government and 
subsequent naval pickup of thousands that had escaped in boats was still a decisive action 
by the administration. This evacuation was done without direct Congressional 
authorization (though they had been consulted, hard details were never agreed). In fact, 
                                                          
28 Reimers, Still the Golden Door, 80-81. 
29 An Act to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes, Public Law 89-236, U.S. 
Statutes at Large 79 (1965): 913. 
30 Robinson, Terms of Refuge, 18. 
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by the time legislation was passed that allocated funds to pay for resettlement and 
provided legal status for the refugees, the majority of them were already on U.S. soil.31 
 Ford had two main reasons for the 1975 evacuation and resettlement. The first 
was a sense of duty and responsibility to the refugees. His executive order in May 1975 
that established an Advisory Committee on the issue demonstrates this sense. He 
described the refugees as those who “stood by America as an ally,” and argues that 
Americans “must open [their] doors and [their] hearts.” He also hearkened back to 
America’s history as a place of refuge for victims of persecution and intolerance.32 In this 
statement he asserted America’s moral duty to both uphold its history as a haven, and its 
duty to stand by its wartime allies.  
Besides moral duty, Cold War political concerns motivated Ford’s claim that 
America must accept the Vietnamese refugees and provide them a new home. In an 
address to Congress, Ford reminded Americans of the Hungarian and Cuban refugees that 
they had accepted in the preceding two decades. He likened these to the Vietnamese 
evacuees, saying “Now, other refugees have fled from the Communist takeover in 
Vietnam. These refugees chose freedom.”33 By linking the refugee admissions to 
America’s wider struggle against Communism, he could justify the expenditure and effort 
required to resettle and integrate these refugees into America. 
 Ford also believed that Indochinese refugee admissions could help America 
recover its image as a benevolent nation after the Vietnam debacle. An incident that 
                                                          
31 Reimers, Still the Golden Door, 179. 
32 Gerald Ford, “Executive Order 11860—Establishing the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees,” 
Executive Order, Washington, DC, May 19, 1975.  
33 Carl J. Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate: the United States and Refugees during the Cold War, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, 147. 
12 
occurred on Guam in the summer and fall of 1975 highlights this fact. Guam was one of 
the staging areas for Indochinese refugees before permanent locations were found for 
them. Here, around 1,600 evacuees claimed that they had been taken from Vietnam 
against their will and demanded to be allowed to return. The administration initially tried 
to stonewall their request, as the sight of evacuees returning to the Communist nation 
would undercut the humanitarian image the U.S. wanted to cultivate with its resettlement 
program. However, after some of the would-be repatriates received media attention by 
beginning hunger strikes, and others set fire to buildings in a riot, the administration 
folded and allowed them to use a former South Vietnamese merchant vessel to return 
home. U.S. officials still attempted to manipulate media coverage surrounding the event, 
however. Kissinger requested that coverage should emphasize the “basic humanitarian 
nature of our effort.”34 The repatriation incident serves to demonstrate the importance the 
Ford administration placed on Indochinese refugee resettlement as a means to rebuild 
image and credibility. 
 President Carter’s term in office coincided with the second-wave surge of boat 
people and land people refugees that began in 1977 and grew rapidly in the next two 
years. The Carter administration’s response was to admit tens of thousands of 
Indochinese unilaterally (and against the public’s wishes), but it also worked to involve 
the rest of the world in managing the crisis. The administration’s response was tied to its 
foreign policy, in ways both particular to Carter’s political priorities and to familiar Cold 
War reasoning. 
                                                          
34 H. M Stur, ""Hiding Behind the Humanitarian Label": Refugees, Repatriates, and the Rebuilding of 
America's Benevolent Image After the Vietnam War," Diplomatic History 39, no. 2 (2014): 223-225, 241. 
13 
 The violence and trauma of the Vietnam War, both overseas and at home in the 
U.S., helped unravel the liberal consensus that America’s moral as well as strategic 
imperative was to contain the spread of communism at all costs. Americans began to 
question whether anti-communist intervention was effective, and if it had subverted the 
nation’s values. This reflection led some to make calls for human rights to be a new 
organizing principle in U.S. foreign policy. These calls found a champion in Jimmy 
Carter, who incorporated them into his domestic and foreign policies, and promised to 
have “a total commitment to the preservation of human rights, individual liberty, and 
freedom of conscience.”35 
 The president’s generous refugee admissions policy can be viewed as part of his 
framework of human rights promotion. Carter made this connection explicitly in a 1978 
speech marking the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He 
stated that “Refugees are the living, homeless casualties of one very important failure on 
the part of the world to live by the principles of peace and human rights.” He goes on to 
state Americans’ duty, both as humans and descendants of refugees, to accept them into 
the country. The address continues to establish that “Human rights is the soul of our 
foreign policy…because human rights is the soul of our sense of nationhood.”36 This link 
from U.S. refugee resettlement policy to U.S. foreign policy, when presented in such 
stark terms, demonstrates the importance the former had to the latter for the United 
States. This connection is further borne out by State Department memos to the UN 
                                                          
35 Barbara J. Keys, Reclaiming American virtue: the human rights revolution of the 1970s, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014, 51, 236. 
36 Jimmy Carter, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights Remarks at a White House  
Meeting Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Declaration's Signing,” Speech, Washington, DC, 
December 6, 1978, The American Presidency Project. 
14 
mission that emphasized the importance of the boat people crisis to the US and the UN’s 
human rights work.37 
 Besides Carter’s focus on refugee resettlement as part of the nation’s human 
rights promotion efforts, he also used traditional Cold War logic to justify Indochinese 
refugee admissions. He believed the U.S. had a special responsibility to assist the boat 
people due to the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War that so deeply affected 
all three countries. He also responded to criticism of refugee admissions by describing the 
boat people as “persecuted by a Communist government in Vietnam, which has taken 
away from them their basic rights.” This reassertion of anti-Communist rhetoric helped 
win over conservatives and neo-conservatives, who in turn supported boat people 
admissions.38 The Carter administration’s expert on Indochina, Richard Holbrooke, also 
pointed to the pressure that the refugees were placing on ASEAN countries like Thailand 
and Indonesia, allies that were important against Communism’s further spread.39 Even in 
a supposed new era for U.S. foreign policy, Cold war logic was paramount and helped 
make refugee resettlement less of a wedge issue. 
 Presidents Ford and Carter admitted these high numbers of refugees under the 
“parole power” provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed the 
president to circumvent immigration quotas to admit foreigners in extraordinary cases.40 
As Indochinese refugees continued to be admitted under this emergency measure, 
Congress moved to normalize the process by passing the Refugee Act in 1980. It set a 
                                                          
37 United States Department of State, Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva and 
the Mission to the United Nations (September 7, 1978), Accessed January 31, 2018. 
38 Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 154. 
39 Ibid, 153-54. 
40 Cristina Rodriguez and Adam Cox, "The President and Immigration Law," Yale Law Journal 118, no. 4 
(January 1, 2009): 501-504, Accessed April 6, 2018. 
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refugee admissions ceiling of 50,000 per year, but allowed the president to increase it 
after consultation with Congress. The Refugee Act also changed the definition of refugee 
from the previous anti-Communist one, to include anyone outside their home country 
with a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”41 This put the United 
States in line with the UN’s language on refugee definition. The effects of this law were 
not felt immediately, as President Reagan initially kept admissions ceilings high, but the 
removal of the parole power has had an impact on future crises.  
 The Reagan administration, though it did not admit as many refugees from 
Indochina as the Carter administration before it, still resettled tens of thousands per 
year.42 Although Reagan did not place the same emphasis on international human rights 
promotion as Carter did, he was a strident anti-Communist, and so the refugee policy’s 
important role in foreign policy continued. Refugee resettlement as a component of 
America’s image was even important enough to Reagan that it featured prominently in 
his farewell address to the nation in 1989. Reagan told the story of an Indochinese child 
who, when pulled from the sea by a Navy sailor, said “Hello American Sailor. Hello, 
freedom man.”43 Reagan then used this image of America helping a refugee to represent 
America’s broader mission of standing for freedom and leadership in the world. 
 Besides its own resettlement initiatives, the United States was very involved in 
the process of finding international solutions to the Indochinese refugee crisis. President 
Carter, at a June 1979 meeting of the G7, was able to convince each of the members to 
                                                          
41 Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 177-178. 
42 Gordon, "Southeast Asian Refugee Migration," 156. 
43 Reagan, Ronald. “Farewell Address to the Nation.” Speech, Washington, DC, January 11, 1989. The 
American Presidency Project. 
16 
increase funding for UNHCR’s budget and to resettle more refugees. He did this by 
leading from the front, with an announcement that the U.S. would increase its monthly 
resettlement to 14,000 refugees, in order to pressure other nations to contribute more.44 
The U.S. also sent vice-president Walter Mondale to chair UNHCR’s 1979 international 
conference of 65 countries on the crisis, whose solutions involved countries of origin, 
countries of first asylum and countries of resettlement working together.45 Later, the 
United States was also a member of the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action, which 
introduced stricter refugee status determination alongside another push for resettlement in 
a bid to end the long crisis.46 
 One specific international program in which the U.S. had a heavy hand is worth 
discussing: the Orderly Departure Program (ODP). This innovative program, which 
began in 1979, allowed would-be refugees to apply for resettlement from Vietnam, rather 
than leave their homes on a dangerous sea journey to become official refugees. Over 
650,000 Vietnamese were resettled to various countries through the ODP.47 458,367 of 
these came to the United States.48 Although it was officially set up by UNHCR, the U.S. 
government pushed the agency to develop the program so that it could work for U.S. 
interests. (Since the U.S. had no diplomatic relations with Vietnam, they could not play a 
direct role in the process). The ODP was used by the U.S. government to both reduce the 
number of refugees leaving the country (and thus help Vietnam’s neighboring countries, 
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U.S. allies), and to secure from Vietnam those of concern to the United States, including 
family members of U.S. citizens and former U.S. government employees.49 
 The United States pursued an active and decisive policy of resettlement of 
Indochinese refugees during the crisis. This was primarily an executive branch activity, 
with Congress following behind with funding and legalization of status resolutions, 
which led to the 1980 Refugee Act that formalized the process. Refugee resettlement 
policy was used as a component of foreign policy, in order to assist U.S. allies in the 
region and to rebuild America’s benevolent image after the Vietnam War. Cold War 
politics also played a huge role in motivating the policy. The U.S. participated in, and in 
some cases spearheaded, multilateral solutions to the crisis.  
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Chapter 2: War on Terror Refugee Policy 
 
 The refugee flows emanating from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria cannot be as 
neatly divided as the three phases that came from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. While 
not all geographically or temporally contiguous, the refugee crises are all linked by U.S. 
involvement in the countries that spawned them, involvement that was and is 
controversial and not particularly successful in achieving American aims (as was the case 
in Southeast Asia). 
 America’s long involvement in the War on Terror began in Afghanistan, which 
the U.S. invaded in 2001 to dislodge the Taliban government that was sheltering Al 
Qaeda. The United States, along with its NATO allies, established military bases and 
attempted to rebuild the country as a democracy, but has ended up fighting a Taliban 
insurgency since the invasion that lasts to this day. Seventeen years on from the initial 
invasion, the Taliban completely controls or is openly active in 70 percent of the 
country.50 
 The conflict has created large numbers of refugees and IDPs, though these 
numbers have fluctuated greatly with the conflict and many of both are unregistered, 
making analysis difficult. However, UNHCR reports that there were 3.6 million refugees 
outside Afghanistan before the invasion, and that there are currently 2.8 million located 
outside the country.51,52 While these statistics seem positive on their face, this reduction 
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of refugees is due not to resettlement but repatriation. This repatriation has been at times 
voluntary and at times coerced by Afghanistan’s neighbors.53 These Afghan refugees 
have been forced to return to a country that is still not safe by most measures, which has 
caused the IDP population to more than double during the long war, so it is hard to 
defend this repatriation as a “win.”54 Seventy-two percent of refugees who have returned 
have been subsequently displaced at least twice by continuing violence.55 
 The United States justified its 2003 invasion of Iraq in part by claiming that 
Saddam Hussein was harboring and supporting al-Qaeda, making the invasion part of the 
campaign to contain terrorism. The U.S. achieved its initial war aim of removing the 
Ba’athist government from power quickly, but the subsequent process of nation-building 
proved much more difficult, as in Afghanistan. The dismantling of the existing state and 
military led to the rise of an insurgency that al-Qaeda used to gain a foothold in the 
country it did not have previously. The invasion also unleashed sectarian tensions that 
erupted in violence between Sunnis, Shi’ites and religious minorities.56 
 As in Afghanistan, many fled the country to escape the violence while many 
others were displaced within the country. UNHCR reported that there were 
approximately 400,000 Iraqi refugees worldwide before the U.S. invasion, but by 2008 
that figure had risen to 2.4 million.57,58 This was accompanied by the creation of 2.7 
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million IDPs over the same period.59 The United States withdrew its combat forces in 
2011, but violence and refugee flows would continue. ISIS, which traces its lineage to the 
post-invasion insurgency, embarked on a campaign of bombings, territory seizure and 
ethnic cleansing beginning in 2014. This has prompted over 260,000 refugees to flee to 
neighboring countries.60 
 For the United States, the Syrian Civil War has become both an anti-terror 
conflict and a proxy conflict against rivals. The civil war began in 2011 with popular 
protests that were part of the Arab Spring, but Islamic terror groups including ISIS have 
contributed significantly to the carnage. Meanwhile, U.S. rivals Iran and Russia have 
supported the Assad regime throughout the conflict. American military involvement 
began solely to combat ISIS and other jihadist groups, but has now been expanded to 
directly challenge the Assad regime (and by extension, its foreign supporters). The 
humanitarian costs of the conflict have been astronomical, however. After seven years of 
war, more than 5.6 million Syrians are registered refugees (although the true number is 
probably higher, since Lebanon has banned refugee registration since 2015). 4.1 million 
of these have come since 2013, when the U.S. entered the conflict by arming and funding 
resistance fighters. On top of the refugees, the Syria conflict has created 6.5 million 
IDPs.61  
 The numbers of refugees the U.S. has admitted from these protracted conflicts has 
been a small proportion of their total numbers. In Afghanistan, the United States has 
resettled 14,947 refugees from FY 2002-2018. It has also admitted around three times as 
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many Afghans as Special Immigrant Visa holders, 49,170 in total. From Iraq, the United 
States has resettled a much higher number of refugees, 143,383 since 2003, while 
admitting 18,167 on SIVs. Syria has seen far fewer refugees admitted to America, with 
only 21,062 since the start of the civil war (21,002 since 2013).62 
 In relative terms, this is far less than the U.S. took in during the Indochinese 
crisis. Iraqi refugees resettled by the United States as a percentage of the total Iraqi 
refugee population is 6.34 percent, which rises to 7.14 percent if SIVs are included. For 
Syria, the same figure is 0.37 percent. These figures are certainly smaller than the 43 
percent share from the Indochinese crisis. As a proportion of U.S. population, the total 
refugee and SIV admissions (246,729) for the three countries for the period covered is 
0.09% (using 2001 as the base year).63 The corresponding figure for the Indochinese 
response was 0.59%. 
 The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 had a huge impact on the Bush 
administration’s refugee policy towards Afghanistan and Iraq. In the immediate wake of 
the tragedy, the president ordered the entire refugee admissions program suspended for 
more than two months. This included canceling admissions for refugees that had already 
made it through the lengthy approval process.64 After the freeze, the State Department 
implemented stricter security checks to supplement the admissions process.65 This was an 
understandable and justified change to the process, given the traumatic nature of 9/11.  
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However, after refugee admissions resumed, they were at much lower levels than 
they had been before 9/11. The Bush administration set its admissions ceiling at 70,000 
for 2002 and kept it there through 2007, raising it to 80,000 in 2008. However, the nation 
admitted significantly fewer than that in each of those years.66 Very few refugees were 
admitted from Afghanistan and Iraq during these years, even as they began to pour out of 
Iraq following the instability caused by the invasion. President Bush did mention 
refugees in several statements and speeches, but it was usually to illustrate the evil 
regimes that were creating them. In his 2003 State of the Union he related stories of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime that came from refugees as part of his justification for the 
coming invasion.67 Congress also authorized the Special Immigrant Visa Program during 
Bush’s tenure, which was intended to reward Iraqis and Afghans who assisted the U.S. 
government in its mission. 
 President Obama inherited the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars from the Bush 
administration in 2009, along with their refugee and IDP situations. His administration 
markedly increased refugee admissions of Iraqis, keeping them near or above 10,000 
annually throughout his entire tenure. His second term also saw a large surge in the 
issuance of SIVs, which may have been due to U.S. withdrawal of troops from Iraq and a 
drawdown in Afghanistan.  
The refugee crisis in Syria also became an issue during the Obama administration, 
and it responded slowly to this crisis. The U.S. admitted fewer than 2,000 refugees from 
Syria in the first 5 years of the war, despite the fact that millions had fled, and the U.S. 
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was a participant in the conflict. The president eventually pledged to take in 10,000 
Syrians in 2016. Critics pointed out that European nations planned to accept far more, 
and even Venezuela planned to accept 20,000.68 Paralleling their reactions in 1975 and 
1979, the U.S. public opposed this plan, with sixty percent opposed and thirty-seven 
percent in favor.69 The administration met this goal despite the criticism, and followed it 
up with plans to increase the global admissions ceiling for 2017 from to 110,000. Obama 
made this announcement in a speech at the United Nations, and called on the other 
nations of the world to follow that example to increase resettlement.70 This attempt 
echoes Jimmy Carter’s attempts in 1979 to use the U.S. as an example to inspire other 
countries. This final policy change would prove to be mostly symbolic, however, as 
Donald Trump’s victory in 2016 brought a drastic change to U.S. refugee policy. 
 Trump campaigned on a promise to cut U.S. refugee admissions, and those from 
Syria specifically (after a brief period when he supported Syrian admissions as a 
humanitarian measure). This was part of his wider promises to reduce U.S. immigration. 
He even called Syrian refugees “a great Trojan Horse for the U.S.,” claiming they posed a 
giant security risk in order to play off of many Americans’ continuing fears of 
terrorism.71 Trump quickly delivered on this promise. One of his first actions as president 
was the so-called “Muslim ban,” which blocked travel from seven Muslim-majority 
nations, but also suspended all refugee admissions for 120 days and banned Syrian 
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refugees indefinitely.72 This order, including the shunning of refugee admissions, drew 
criticism from many countries, including America’s allies in Europe doing just the 
opposite. Despite that original order being mostly blocked in the courts, Trump has 
followed through on his promise to resettle fewer refugees, and especially fewer refugees 
from Syria. At the same time, he has admitted record numbers of Special Immigrant Visa 
holders. This may indicate the administration plans to stay strategically involved in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and needs to ensure it can continue to recruit local allies. 
 The United States’ has resettled fewer refugees from War on Terror related 
countries than it did in the Indochinese crisis, both in absolute and relative terms. The 
September 11th terrorist attacks brought a halt to all refugee admissions, and they did not 
rise back to pre-2001 levels until the Obama administration. Although refugee admissions 
were low, Congress did create the Special Immigrant Visa program to recruit and reward 
local Iraqis and Afghans, using refugee-like policy as a component of foreign policy. The 
Trump administration has continued the SIV program, but has been incredibly hostile to 
not just the practice of but the concept of refugee resettlement, marking a dramatic shift 
in U.S. policy. 
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Chapter 3: Analysis 
 
The legacy of America’s military failure in Southeast Asia weighed extremely 
heavily on its subsequent refugee policy in the region. By the end of the Vietnam War, 
Americans had come to grips with the idea that their involvement in the region was 
unsuccessful, and the rapid collapse of South Vietnam confirmed this. The refugee crisis 
itself arose (in part) because the United States failed in its goal of containing the 
Communist regime in North Vietnam and would-be regimes in Laos and Cambodia. 
When the refugees began to flow out of the region, the United States accepted so many of 
them because it had accepted that its military and political vision for the region had lost 
out. As noted, the United States did not admit any refugees from the region prior to South 
Vietnam’s final defeat in 1975 (admittedly most of the millions displaced during the war 
were technically not refugees, but IDPs). To do so would have been to admit that 
America and its non-communist allies were losing. 
 This is the biggest reason for the differing response to the refugee crises in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. As the United States is still in the midst of its War on Terror 
engagements in these countries, an acceptance of refugees on the scale seen post-Vietnam 
would be a recognition that America is not creating the safe, stable, terrorism-free 
democracies that it has aimed to create. This is especially true of the Bush administration, 
who began the Iraq and Afghanistan engagements, and resettled very few refugees even 
when the situation became dire, preferring to rely on dubiously effective repatriation. As 
the United States continues its long-running engagement in the region, the changing 
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perception of its political and military success or failure will likely have a bearing on its 
refugee resettlement policy, just as it did in Southeast Asia. 
 Another very important reason for the difference between the policies is the 
nature of the Cold War versus the War on Terror. The Cold War, though far from a 
moment of perfect agreement in American politics, did provide a measure of consensus in 
U.S. foreign policy. Linking a policy to the struggle against Communism provided a 
ready avenue to help it gain political, if not always popular, support. The Cold War 
dynamic also required the United States to work closely with allies and attend at least 
somewhat to their interests, and to pursue multilateral solutions to its problems, which 
was reflected in the response to the Indochinese crisis. The War on Terror, though also a 
struggle against an ideology deemed dangerous to America and the world, has not 
provided the same sort of political consensus at home. As a result, there has not been 
similar support for Middle Eastern refugees, even though they can be seen as victims of 
that same ideology. The United States has also become comparatively more unilateral in 
its global dealings since the end of the Cold War (e.g. the 2003 invasion of Iraq that was 
widely criticized by many U.S. allies). This unilateralism has manifested itself in the 
relative paucity of refugee crisis solutions spearheaded or supported by the U.S. in the 
War on Terror. 
 It must also be acknowledged that the statutory environment surrounding U.S. 
refugee resettlement has also changed, in part due to the experience of the Indochinese 
crisis. Gone are the days of widespread parole power admissions and ad-hoc policy. 
However, even under the 1980 legal framework of the admissions ceiling and 
consultation with Congress, the United States still pursued an active resettlement policy 
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and admissions numbers stayed high, at least for a time. The Reagan administration 
resettled 160,000 refugees in 1981 and around 100,000 in 1982, the majority of whom 
were from Indochina.73 Thus, the legal environment, though different, is only a small part 
of the reason for the differing policies. Far more important to our understanding of the 
differing responses is the United States’ appraisal of its strategic success (or lack thereof) 
in each situation, and the nature of the Cold War and the War on Terror as political 
unifiers. 
 Yet despite the fact that several factors have combined to create a different policy 
today than the U.S. employed in the Indochinese crisis, there are still lessons to be 
learned from the United States’ past experience. The next chapter will discuss policy 
changes that the U.S. can enact to improve its implementation of foreign policy goals, 
revive its image, gather domestic support for resettlement, and better respond to 
humanitarian needs. 
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Chapter 4: Policy Recommendations 
 
 The first, most urgent policy recommendation is directed at the current 
administration. President Trump has set the FY 2018 refugee admissions ceiling at 
45,000, with 17,500 of those allocated to the Near East/South Asia region that includes 
the countries discussed in this paper.74 This is the lowest the ceiling has ever been set, 
dating back to the 1980 passage of the Refugee Act which established the requirement.75 
However, the administration is on track to admit less than half that number, based on 
admissions from the first quarter of FY 2018.76 This markedly diminished rate comes at a 
time when the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide has never been higher.77 
The United States has previously used its position as global resettlement leader to 
pressure other countries into action.78 Now, with the nation on track to admit only 21,000 
refugees from across the globe this year, America risks losing this status. Trump’s slogan 
may be “America First,” but this is one position where America may no longer be 
number one. The Trump administration should move to at least admit as many refugees 
as the ceiling will allow. 
 It seems unlikely that the current administration will consider raising the refugee 
ceiling after slashing it so drastically. However, a future administration can and should 
raise it once again. There are obvious humanitarian arguments for increased U.S. 
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resettlement. But besides these, a future administration should cast resettlement in foreign 
policy terms to convince Congress and the American public of the necessity of increased 
admissions. Increasing resettlement could help the U.S. repair relations with allies 
experiencing refugee flows, and also help the country rebuild its international image in 
the wake of its unpopular War on Terror involvement. Both of these methods of 
reasoning were used to justify America’s resettlement of the Indochinese in the 1970s 
and 80s, but could also prove useful in America’s current geopolitical situation. 
Turkey is a prime candidate for this first type of benefit from increased 
resettlement. It currently houses over 3.5 million refugees from the Syria conflict, and the 
International Organization for Migration reports that social cohesion is diminishing as 
tensions rise between the refugees and their Turkish hosts.79 At the same time, American-
Turkish relations are at a nadir because Turkey claims the U.S. abetted an unsuccessful 
coup attempt in 2016, and the U.S. is supporting Kurdish fighters in Syria that Turkey 
claims are terrorists. American officials say that relations are at a “crisis point.”80 If the 
U.S. were to focus on resettling Syrian refugees from Turkish camps, it would help 
relieve pressure on Turkey’s government, and could be a step toward repairing relations 
between the countries.  
The European Union has also seen a flood of asylum seekers petitioning for 
refugee status in the last three years. Over 3.1 million new applicants filed for this status 
from 2015-2017, and the top three countries of origin for these would-be refugees were 
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Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.81 Contemporaneously, U.S.-European relations have become 
strained as President Trump rails against what he sees as unfair trade practices and an 
unfair level of contribution to European defense. The transatlantic relationship that has 
underpinned the postwar order is said to be fraying. Besides the prognostications of 
analysts, multiple polls describe this damaged relationship.82 However, one way the 
United States could rebuild Europeans’ goodwill would be admitting asylum seekers to 
the U.S. from the EU once their status is determined. That way, the U.S. would be seen as 
shouldering some of the burden that its allies, by virtue of their proximity to the Middle 
East, are feeling that the U.S. is not. If U.S. authorities can accept the validity of 
European procedures to determine refugee status, it will even save the government time 
and resources in the admissions process. 
Besides reassuring individual allies of its continuing commitment to their 
interests, increased refugee resettlement would help America improve its global image 
that has been damaged by its involvement in the War on Terror. Several of America’s 
strategies of prosecuting the war, from its use of “enhanced interrogation” and black 
sites, to its increasingly widespread drone bombing campaign, have proved very 
unpopular with publics across the globe. This has translated to a loss of confidence in the 
U.S. as a whole, an effect that was most pronounced during the Bush years but still 
present during the Obama administration.83 A future administration could use the 
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increased resettlement of refugees from War on Terror conflict zones to shore up the 
image of the U.S. as a protector of freedom and human rights, in a similar way the Ford 
and Carter administrations used Indochinese refugee resettlement to rebuild America’s 
image after Vietnam. 
 The American public’s opposition to refugee resettlement often stems from two 
worries: that they will be an economic drag or a security risk. However, research has 
shown quite the opposite to be true. The National Bureau of Economic Research has 
found that refugees work at higher rates than natives, and that they contribute more in 
taxes than they receive in public assistance in the long term.84 The Federal Reserve 
reports that immigrants, especially refugees, have a much higher success rate when 
starting their own businesses.85 Here too the legacy of the Indochinese refugee policy can 
be illustrative. Research has found that Vietnamese immigrants (composed almost 
entirely of resettled refugees and their family members who entered later under the 
family-unification category), have higher incomes and are less likely to live in poverty 
than the native-born population.86 Security concerns, of particular importance in the age 
of the War on Terror, are also overblown. The CATO Institute has found that the odds of 
an American dying in a terror attack by a refugee is 1 in 3.64 billion per year. All three of 
these deaths occurred before the 1980 Refugee Act added more security checks to the 
admissions process.87 Should a future administration decide to increase its refugee 
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admissions as recommended, it should also institute a public information campaign to 
inform the American public that refugees are not a security risk or an economic burden. 
 Statutory changes should accompany the increase of the admissions ceiling. 
Under current U.S. immigration law (Section 209 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act), refugee status is only good for one year. All persons admitted to the U.S. as 
refugees are required to apply to have their status adjusted to legal permanent resident 
(LPR) after that time.88 This process means more work for the Department of Homeland 
Security, which wastes time and money. The rigorous system now in place to vet 
refugees before their admission has outstripped the admissions checks that were in place 
in 1980, at the Refugee Act’s passage. Furthermore, the differences between the factors 
that would cause a refugee to be denied adjustment to LPR status, and those that would 
necessitate deportation of an LPR, have been mostly eliminated, rendering this status 
adjustment process redundant.89 The U.S. government should amend the admissions 
process to directly admit refugees as legal permanent residents. Removing the time-
intensive extra step of LPR status adjustment would eliminate tens of thousands of filings 
per year, freeing up some of the resources needed to process more resettlement 
applications as discussed above. This change would also make life easier for the refugees 
themselves. 
 One other policy that should be improved is the Special Immigrant Visa Program. 
Despite the Trump administration continuing the trend of increasing SIV admissions, 
there is still a large backlog in the program. Around 14,000 applicants (solely primary 
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applicants, not including family members) are still waiting on the process, and there are 
only 3,500 SIVs allotted for 2018.90 This is especially troubling as U.S. involvement 
continues in both Iraq and Afghanistan, which means more Iraqis and Afghans will be 
needed to serve as interpreters and contractors. In Afghanistan, the military plans to 
increase its presence with more troops on the ground and more aircraft operations, 
meaning those eligible to apply for SIVs will increase further.91 The tenuous position of 
the SIV program does not bode well for the U.S.’ ability to recruit allies on the ground in 
these countries, and thus to achieve its military and foreign policy goals. Furthermore, a 
failure here will likely be remembered by potential allies in future conflicts, so there are 
long-term ramifications. The U.S. Congress should immediately authorize more SIVs and 
continue to do so until American involvement in the countries ends, and there are no 
more valid applicants. 
 As the U.S. becomes more involved in the Syria conflict, Congress should 
consider setting up an SIV program for Syria as well. Already there are U.S. troops in the 
country, fighting both jihadist groups and pro-regime forces alongside local allies. 
Though it is not known exactly what roles these U.S. troops are playing, it seems safe to 
assume that they are utilizing local Syrians as guides and interpreters. As such, it appears 
there is, or will be, a population of Syrians that would be threatened if they came under 
the sway of the Syrian regime or jihadists. If such an event does come to pass, Congress 
should authorize an SIV program for Syria. It does no good to operate and fully fund 
such a program in one or two countries if it is not implemented in another situation where 
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it is needed. However, the U.S. has also relied heavily on proxy fighters in its efforts 
against ISIS and the regime. These Syrians, even if they did not work directly for 
Americans as interpreters, would still be threatened and might wish to flee in the event of 
a regime victory. To maintain credibility with current and future allies, Congress should 
consider extending SIV eligibility to those fighters funded by or receiving supplies from 
the U.S. and fighting on its behalf. 
 The U.S. can look to its admissions and successful integration of over a million 
Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotians as a high point for its engagement with the world 
and its promotion of human rights and humanitarian assistance. With carefully crafted 
policies that would assist implementation of America’s foreign policy objectives, rebuild 
its image, and streamline its process of refugee admissions without endangering its 
security or economy, that high point can happen again. 
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Appendix B 
Chart 394 
US Refugee and Special Immigrant Visa Admissions from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, 
2002-2018 
Fiscal 
Year Afghanistan Iraq Syria 
Yearly Total 
(Refugee 
Only) 
Yearly Total 
(Refugee+SIV) 
  Refugee SIV* Refugee SIV*      
2002 1,683     1,683 1,683 
2003 1,453  298   1,751 1,751 
2004 959  66   1,025 1,025 
2005 902  198   1,100 1,100 
2006 651  202   853 853 
2007 441  1,608   2,049 2,049 
2008 576 228 13,822 538  14,398 15,164 
2009 349 775 18,838 1,557  19,187 21,519 
2010 515 108 18,016 2,000  18,531 20,639 
2011 428 101 9,388 618 29 9,845 10,564 
2012 481 109 12,163 3,203 31 12,675 15,987 
2013 661 442 19,488 1,460 36 20,185 22,087 
2014 753 7,156 19,769 3,084 105 20,627 30,867 
2015 910 6,336 12,676 890 1,682 15,268 22,494 
2016 2,737 10,220 9,880 2,049 12,587 25,204 37,473 
2017 1,311 16,866 6,886 2,455 6,557 14,754 34,075 
2018 137 6,829 85 313 35 257 7,399 
Totals 14,947 49,170 143,383 18,167 21,062 179,392 246,729 
        
        
 
Refugee numbers as of January 31, 2018.   
SIV numbers as of February 26, 2018.   
 *Special Immigrant Visa     
                                                          
94 Compiled by the author from the following sources:  
 
United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing 
Center, Refugee Admissions Report January 31, 2018, January 31, 2018, Accessed February 26, 2018. 
 
United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing 
Center, Cumulative Arrivals by State for Refugee and SIV - Afghan FY07 -FY17 as of February 26, 2018, 
February 26, 2018, Accessed February 26, 2018. 
 
United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Refugee Processing 
Center, Cumulative Arrivals by State for Refugee and SIV - Iraqi FY07 -FY17 as of February 26, 2018, 
February 26, 2018, Accessed February 26, 2018. 
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